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Globalized Localism: Canada’s Government Procurement Commitments 
under CETA 
 
David Collins∗ 
 
This article examines Canada’s commitments under the procurement chapter of the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) currently awaiting ratification by 
Canada and the European Union (EU). While the CETA’s procurement rules are substantively 
and procedurally similar to those of the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s Revised 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), Canada’s obligations under CETA penetrate 
deeply into procurement decisions at all levels of government, including notably those made 
by municipal entities and other local public bodies such as school boards. CETA retains 
important exceptions which should preserve the rights of government to pursue some social 
goals in aid of small businesses and economically deprived areas. It also applies monetary 
thresholds which should help ensure that the agreement’s primary focus is on contracts awarded 
to large multinationals. Despite these restrictions, CETA’s fostering of international 
competition in the previously insulated spheres of government may herald a new era of 
economic globalization. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE CETA AND GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN CANADA 
AND EUROPE 
 
Government procurement has become a key source of economic activity worldwide, 
particularly in developed countries and in those states in which the public sector makes up a 
significant component, in some cases up to 15 per cent of GDP.1 Indeed, when taking into 
account activities at sub-central and municipal levels, governments are often the largest single 
purchaser of goods and services in an economy. The new Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union (EU) which is expected to be 
ratified by 2016 contains detailed rules on liberalizing government procurement. It will provide 
Canadian and European suppliers of products and services access to each other’s procurement 
processes on a preferential basis, giving them the opportunity to secure valuable government 
contracts. The overall value of contracts awarded by the Canadian federal government alone 
was estimated at CDN $ 15 to 19 billion per year, with the value of tenders from other levels 
of government considered to exceed these numbers significantly. In 2011 procurements by 
Canadian municipalities was estimated at CDN $ 112 billion or almost 7 per cent of Canadian 
GDP.2  
 
It is not difficult to see why the EU aggressively pursued the negotiation of government 
procurement in CETA, especially at the sub-central level, as a key component of its economic 
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relations with Canada. For Canadian firms, the EU’s government procurement market is one 
of the largest in the world, estimated to be worth CDN $3.3 trillion annually.3 Removing 
barriers to procurement under CETA should also increase competition among suppliers, 
ensuring that governments and taxpayers obtain value for money in a wide range of sectors. 
For EU suppliers, CETA’s procurement chapter will, for the first time, commit all sub-federal 
levels of government in Canada to opening their procurement markets to EU bidders, including 
most notably municipal governments as well as public schools boards. The inclusion of sub-
central governments in Canada’s CETA procurement commitments is of critical importance 
given that Canada’s federal system accords extensive powers to the provinces,4 rendering 
provincial-level procurement of considerable economic significance. In the long run, CETA’s 
procurement rules should ensure the delivery of better public services at lower cost, even if 
some of the firms which had benefited from favourable treatment in the past see their profits 
decline. It is hoped that under tighter rules, local governments may be compelled to seek 
innovative procurement solutions involving more intelligent contract design and careful risk 
assessment.5  
 
 This article will consider some of the key features of CETA’s procurement chapter, 
noting its similarities with the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s Revised Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA) and examining Canada’s specific commitments in certain 
sectors and levels of government. These commitments, contained in annexes to the main 
chapter, have been disparaged by some because they have the potential to encroach on a variety 
of smaller public entities’ ability to use spending to achieve important social goals even as they 
open up lucrative markets for Canadian firms in Europe. 
 
 
1. CETA’S GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CHAPTER 
 
The chief substantive protection afforded by CETA’s procurement chapter is its 
guarantee of national treatment. Article IV outlines the CETA procurement chapter’s general 
non-discrimination provision, allowing for equal market access between foreign and locally 
supplied goods and services. Under sub-section (1): ‘each Party ...shall accord immediately 
and unconditionally to the goods and services of the other Party and to the suppliers of the other 
Party …, treatment no less favourable than the treatment the Party …, accords to goods, 
services and suppliers’. Subsection (2) of Art IV extends the non-discrimination obligation to 
the suppliers of the goods and services themselves, recognizing that formally identical 
treatment of goods alone can be insufficient to eradicate discrimination against suppliers. 
Accordingly, this provision states that Party’s governmental procurement measures must not: 
‘(a) treat a locally established supplier less favourably than another locally established supplier 
on the basis of the degree of foreign affiliation or ownership; or (b) discriminate against a 
locally established supplier on the basis that the goods or services offered by that supplier for 
a particular procurement are goods or services of the other Party’. These provisions effectively 
operate as a check on barriers to foreign investment in party states. EU firms will be more 
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likely to locate their operations in Canada, possibly by merging with a local firm, when they 
are secure in the knowledge that they will not face discrimination because they are owned by 
non-Canadian shareholders. 
 
 In keeping with a growing trend in international treaties,6 CETA’s procurement chapter 
mandates that procurement procedures are fully transparent and as such it restricts the ability 
of government at any level to circumscribe the agreement’s non-discrimination obligations by 
impairing foreign firms’ access to information about procurement opportunities. CETA’s rules 
on transparency and electronic tendering will allow firms from both Canada and the EU to 
access a single electronic procurement website (one for Canada and one for the EU) that 
combines information on all tenders and access to public procurement at all levels of 
government, enhancing the capacity of suppliers from each country to compete in each other’s 
procurement markets. Article IV.4 states that procuring entities shall conduct covered 
procurement in a transparent and impartial manner, which includes open tendering that avoids 
conflicts of interest and prevents corrupt practices. There are further transparency and 
disclosure requirements contained in Article V of CETA’s procurement chapter, requiring 
covered government entities to promptly publish all rules relating to procurement activities as 
well as to respond to queries regarding this information. Notification procedures for all 
intended procurements are outlined in detail. There are specific requirements for three types of 
tendering procedures: open, in which all interested suppliers may bid; selective, in which only 
those suppliers invited to do so may bid; and limited tendering procedures in which potential 
suppliers are contacted individually, a method used when there has been no response to an open 
tender or where extreme urgency makes open tendering impractical. Additional transparency 
obligations are listed in Article XV, which requires procuring entities to notify promptly all 
suppliers participating in tenders of their decisions with an explanation of reasons and the 
identity of the successful bidder. 
 
Article III of the government procurement chapter of CETA contains security and 
general exceptions using language inspired by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) of which both Canada and the EU, as WTO members, are signatories. The security 
exception under subsection (1) uses the familiar self-judging language which removes the 
scrutiny of such justification from any international tribunal: ‘Nothing in this Chapter shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from taking any action or not disclosing any information that it 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests …, or to procurement 
indispensable for national security or for national defence purposes’. The general exceptions 
under sub-section (2) are those measures which are necessary to ‘a) protect public morals, order 
or safety; b) …protect human, animal or plant life or health; c) … to protect intellectual 
property or d) relating to goods or services of persons with disabilities, philanthropic 
institutions or prison labour’. These broad categories, which have the potential to apply to a 
wide range of government purchasing decisions, are qualified by the chapeau which requires 
that any such measures must not be ‘applied in a manner that would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Parties where the same conditions prevail or 
a disguised restriction on international trade,’ again echoing the well-established language of 
GATT Article XX. It should be noted that while CETA does not fall within the jurisdiction of 
the WTO’s dispute settlement system (see more below) GATT/WTO jurisprudence on general 
exceptions could inform the understanding of these terms as seen in the CETA.7 
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Generally speaking, the substantive and procedural obligations undertaken by Canada 
and the EU in CETA’s procurement chapter aim at eliminating discriminatory treatment against 
foreign suppliers of goods and services in procurement practices in order to promote even 
competition. They also seek to improve the openness of procurement processes as a way of 
ensuring fairness, preventing corruption and enhancing the availability of information on 
procurement activities. As many of the administrative requirements of the procurement chapter 
could be described as onerous in that they mandate extensive information collection and 
dissemination, CETA appears to shift some of these costs of participating in public contracts 
from the private to the public sector, freeing up resources that could be put to more productive 
uses. While the CETA may accordingly expand the competitive opportunities for international 
firms, it could raise compliance costs for government entities, including those often less well-
resourced sub-central and municipal ones. 
 
2. CETA AND THE REVISED WTO GPA 
 
The chapter on government procurement in CETA is almost identical to the Revised 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which 
entered into force in April 2014. The GPA is a plurilateral agreement, which means that it is 
optional, unlike the other treaties concluded during the Uruguay Round of negotiations which 
created the WTO, such as the GATT itself. The new GPA streamlined the earlier GPA of 1994 
and includes provisions on electronic tendering for government contracts as well as further 
material on transparency and the prevention of corruption. Along with the earlier GPA, which 
is still in force for those WTO Member states which have not yet accepted the revised version, 
there are 43 current signatories to the WTO’s government procurement regime—including 
Canada and the EU (along with its 28 constituent states)—all of which have acceded to the 
revised regime. All Member states of the WTO are eligible to accede to the GPA and ten states 
are currently engaged in this process. Other WTO members made commitments in their WTO 
accession protocols to join the GPA in the future, including the large economies of the Russian 
Federation and Saudi Arabia—China, more notably, has observer status. Clearly liberalizing 
government procurement practices is of vital concern to the international community.  
 
Like CETA’s procurement chapter, the WTO GPA is supplemented by annexes issued 
by each signatory party. These materials specify which sectors of procurement activity (branch 
of government, type of good or service) to which commitments contained in the main 
agreement apply. Only procurement carried out by a covered entity purchasing covered goods, 
services or construction services of a contract valued above the indicated monetary threshold, 
and not specifically exempted, are subject to the main agreement’s rules. The annexes contain 
commitments relating to procurement by central government agencies (Annex 1); sub-central 
government agencies (Annex 2); other entities (Annex 3), goods (Annex 4); services (Annex 
5); construction services (Annex 6); and general notes (Annex 7). Some exemptions from 
coverage by Canada and the EU under their GPA annexes are worthy of mention. First, 
Canada’s and the EU’s Annex 1 present extensive lists of central government agencies, 
committing the same monetary minimum thresholds of 130,000 Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs) for goods and services respectively and 5,000,000 SDRs for construction services. 
SDRs are a unit of currency invented by the International Monetary Fund based on a basket of 
various currency values. At the time of writing, an SDR was worth roughly CDN $1.77 or 
€1.24.  
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After some delay8 Canada included its sub-central governments in GPA coverage under 
its Annex 2. The minimum threshold for covered procurements is 355,000 SDRs for goods and 
services and 5,000,000 SDRs for construction services. Some noteworthy omissions of its sub-
central GPA procurement commitments are culture-related procurement for the province of 
Quebec, procurement in some provinces relating to highway construction, any procurement in 
any province tied to the promotion of environmental protection as long as these are not 
‘disguised barriers to international trade,’ and procurement relating to assistance for distressed 
areas. The EU’s sub-central Annex specifies that it does not cover procurement activities for 
which commitments were not made by Canada ‘until such time as the EU has accepted that the 
Parties concerned provide satisfactory reciprocal access to EU goods, suppliers, services and 
service providers to their own procurement markets’. The EU’s Annex 3 specifies that neither 
the central government (EU government entities) nor any of its 28 member state governments 
or their sub-national government agencies commits ‘procurement for the pursuit of an 
activity…when exposed to competitive forces in the market’ as well as activities relating to the 
supply of drinking water or electricity. Canada’s Annex 5 on services exempts government-
owned research facilities and shipbuilding and EU’s services annex offers a somewhat cautious 
limitation on its commitments, only promising to extend GPA coverage to services providers 
from other parties to the extent that those parties have also made commitments in that area. 
Under the annexes on construction services, Canada does not commit construction procurement 
on behalf of the Federal Department of Transport (effectively excluding national highways), 
and the EU again excludes commitments to construction services suppliers from other parties 
where those parties have not made such a commitment itself under its Annex 6. Canada’s 
general notes annex clarifies that none of Canada’s procurement commitments relate to urban 
transportation systems or any measures adopted to support aboriginal peoples. It also exempts 
agricultural support programs and ‘set asides’ for small or minority owned businesses. The EU 
likewise exempts agricultural support programs as well as procurement relating to drinking 
water and energy. 
 
Under Article XVII of CETA, as with the Revised GPA9 (and also NAFTA10), both 
parties to the agreement are required to maintain ‘bid challenge’ procedures for foreign bidders 
who feel that they have been prejudiced by either bidding procedures or contract awards. This 
means that the federal government of Canada and each of its provincial governments must 
maintain independent tribunals to review such challenges and recommend any discrepancies, 
allowing firms the right to be represented, to receive explanations for the tribunal’s decision, 
to have it decided in a timely fashion.  
 
For the Canadian federal government this judicial oversight has been fulfilled by the 
Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT).11 This court also satisfies the bid challenge 
requirements of the GPA, NAFTA and Canada’s Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) which 
also contains provisions on non-discrimination and transparency similar to those of CETA’s 
procurement chapter. There is a well-established practice under the CITT with extensive 
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jurisprudence under these and other trade agreements.12 Under Article XVII.7 b) of CETA (the 
equivalent to XVIII.7 b) of the GPA), when the domestic reviewing body has established that 
there has been a breach of the agreement, there must be provision for ‘corrective action or 
compensation for the loss or damages suffered, which may be limited to either the costs for the 
preparation of the tender or the costs relating to the challenge, or both’. This provision raises 
the prospect that Canada (and the EU) could be exposed to significant damages claims by 
aggrieved firms for failure to fulfil its CETA procurement obligations. The bid challenge 
procedure must also be able to award ‘rapid interim measures’ to preserve the complainant 
supplier’s opportunity to participate in the original bid, which may include suspension of the 
contract award. These provisions should not be viewed as an unusual or onerous feature of the 
agreement, as mechanisms for investor-state dispute settlement coupled with a range of 
remedial measures are common to regional trade agreements and are enshrined in the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) and United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) procedural rules. 
 
 It should be noted that CETA’s investor-state dispute settlement feature, in which 
aggrieved investors can bring claims directly against host states through international 
arbitration facilities, does not apply to the government procurement chapter but only to its 
chapter on Foreign Direct Investment. CETA’s general dispute settlement provisions, allowing 
for claims relating to the interpretation and application of any of the agreement’s provisions 
brought by one state party against the other, does encompass the government procurement 
chapter. As such, a supplier has the option of pursuing direct relief through the bid challenge 
procedure or indirectly by asking its government (Canada or the EU) to seek clarification or 
interpretation of any aspect of CETA that affects their procurement activities by an 
international arbitration body constituted pursuant to CETA’s general dispute settlement 
rubric. The latter course of action seems less pragmatic for firms eager for monetary 
compensation for specific instances of unfair treatment. The state-to-state dispute settlement 
procedure may be more appropriate for systemic violations of procurement rules.  
 
The lack of recourse to the WTO state-to-state dispute settlement system under CETA 
(as opposed to the GPA) may represent the most significant procedural difference between the 
two agreements. Article 14.3 of CETA’s dispute settlement chapter specifies that recourse to 
the dispute settlement provisions of CETA are without prejudice to any action that Canada or 
the EU might bring under the GPA (which allows for access to the WTO dispute settlement 
procedure). This provision goes on to state however that a party shall not seek redress for the 
breach of an obligation which is equivalent in substance under CETA and under the WTO 
agreement in the two fora. Once a dispute settlement proceeding has been initiated under either 
CETA or the WTO (for procurement purposes based on the GPA), the party shall not bring a 
claim seeking redress for the breach of a substantially equivalent obligation under the other 
agreement to the other forum. The only exception for this is if the forum selected fails to make 
findings on that claim, for example if it refuses to take jurisdiction over the dispute. This is a 
sensible clarification that should help resolve some of the frustration and expense associated 
with parallel claims in multiple fora. 
 
                                                          
12
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supplier was not a GPA signatory). The CITT maintains an on-line searchable database of all of its decisions: 
<www.citt.gc.ca>.  
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Among the other notable differences between CETA’s government procurement 
chapter and the Revised GPA are the latter’s provisions for special and differential treatment 
for developing countries, which are of course irrelevant to CETA.  
 
3. CANADA’S SPECIFIC CETA PROCUREMENT COMMITMENTS 
 
In order to fully appreciate the impact of CETA’s procurement chapter on the Canadian 
economy, and to understand the more substantive differences between CETA and the GPA, it 
is necessary to consider the specific market access commitments Canada has made under 
CETA. As with the GPA, CETA’s procurement chapter is structured in a ‘positive list’ format, 
with both central governments, as well as sub-central entities listing the specific agencies and 
types of procurement contract to which the main agreement’s obligations apply. The chief 
limitation on a government’s commitment is that relating to its monetary minimum threshold, 
expressed in SDRs.  
 
The most significant difference between Canada’s commitments under the WTO GPA 
and the CETA are that the latter agreement lists lower thresholds for some types of procurement 
at the sub-central level, specifying minimum values of 200,000 SDRs for goods and services, 
considerably less than those contained in the GPA. The construction services thresholds are the 
same at 5,000,000 SDRs and provincial procurement linked to crown corporations 
(government-owned entities but which operate at arm’s length from the state) and specified in 
Annex X-03, have higher thresholds at 355,000 SDRs. In an interesting note under Annex 5, 
sub-central procurement thresholds will be the higher level of 355,000 SDR when an entity 
procures consulting services regarding matters of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which 
could reasonably be expected to compromise government confidences, and can cause economic 
disruption or similarly be contrary to public interest—the limit is somewhat redundant in light 
of the national security exception noted above. Federal level thresholds are 130,000 SDRs for 
goods and services and 5,000,000 SDRs for construction, the same as they are under the WTO 
GPA.  
 
Although CETA exposes more sub-central government procurement activities to its 
disciplines than the GPA, in terms of substantial economic impact it is clear that CETA is 
meant to control relatively large scale public contracting only, allowing governments to give 
preference to local suppliers in smaller contracts as they wish. As with the GPA, CETA 
procurement rules apply only to high-value procurement contracts, demonstrating the chapter’s 
primary relevance to larger multinational firms and belying accusations that CETA represents 
a drastic infringement on the capacity of governments to invoke purchasing practices that are 
helpful to local suppliers. These generous limits preserve governments’ ability to continue to 
use procurement as an instrument to support community development and to assist small and 
medium-sized enterprises by offering them purchasing contracts on favourable terms. It should 
be noted also that CETA’s thresholds for goods and services are considerably higher than those 
found in Canada’s domestic Agreement on Internal Trade (which facilitates inter-provincial 
commerce).  
 
Canada’s procurement commitments under its annexes to the procurement chapter of 
CETA have been criticized for restricting many provincial and municipal government bodies 
from using public spending to achieve social goals, such as stimulating local employment.13 
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The role of government procurement in achieving social justice, including mitigating 
inequality, has been noted by a number of commentators.14 While the procurement chapter has 
general exceptions for certain public policy goals—including the potentially expansive ‘public 
morals and public order’—and, as noted above, are controlled by the requirement that they are 
necessary and not disguised restrictions on trade. WTO case law has shown that these 
exceptions are incredibly difficult tests to pass.15 In addition to lower coverage thresholds at 
the provincial level, Canada’s CETA procurement commitments go beyond existing 
commitments under the GPA because they include most utilities, crown corporations, and the 
broader so-called MASH sector (Municipalities, Academic institutes, School boards and 
Hospitals). Canada’s sub-central commitments under the GPA exclude MASH sector 
procurement in all provinces except Ontario and Quebec.16 The activities of these bodies are 
often intimately tied to the needs of local communities, even while their purchasing activities 
may not be as economically significant, particularly when it falls under specified thresholds. 
Municipal governments, utilities and MASH entities are prohibited from adopting minimum 
local content requirements for all goods and services contracts above 200,000 SDRs or 400,000 
SDRs for utilities and all construction projects above 5,000,000 SDRs. In this regard, it should 
be recognized that Article II.6 of CETA’s procurement chapter prohibits municipalities and 
MASH entities from dividing up a proposed contract into separate procurements with the 
intention of excluding the contract from CETA’s rules—preventing governments from making 
larger contracts look like small ones. This includes ‘recurring contracts’—effectively 
consolidating a series of smaller transactions into one for the purposes of a total valuation. This 
methodology, which is also seen in Article 6 of the Revised WTO GPA, has the potential to 
capture many smaller varieties of purchases, such as ‘buy local’ policies in schools, hospitals 
or other municipal agencies. A number of Canadian cities objected to the inclusion of these 
provisions in the CETA.17 
 
When contracts exceed these levels, such entities cannot impose local training quotas, 
nor can they apply any other ‘offsets’. Offsets are defined in CETA (as they are in the GPA, 
where they are also prohibited) as ‘any condition or undertaking that encourages local 
development or improves a Party's balance-of-payments accounts, such as the use of domestic 
content, the licensing of technology, investment, counter-trade and similar action or 
requirement’.18 This interdiction is in keeping with prohibitions contained in Canada’s other 
regional trade agreements, such as NAFTA, and is echoed in the WTO’s Trade Related 
Investment Measures Agreement (TRIMs). The logic behind these prohibitions is simple: 
performance requirements such as offsets are generally economically inefficient, ultimately 
resulting in a waste of government expenditure and a causing a damaging distortion of trade or 
investment in favour of non-competitive suppliers. While they may benefit the immediate 
recipient in the short term, they are harmful to the economy at large.19 
 
Some key exceptions that address social objectives, even if they may represent minor 
distortions in the market for public contracts, are specified in Canada’s CETA procurement 
annexes. Under Annex 7 which contains general provisions, healthcare services and research 
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(Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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and development services are not included, likely removing contracts conducted by hospital 
and universities from the scope of CETA and allowing domestic preferences in these fields. 
Neither the Canadian federal government, nor any of the provinces, are bound in their 
procurement practices from measures relating to aboriginal peoples. As in the GPA, 
procurement relating to cultural matters is also excluded for Quebec. Subsection 4 of this 
Annex also specifies that the provinces and territories of Manitoba, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Prince Edward 
Island and Yukon ‘may derogate from the procurement chapter in order to promote regional 
economic development’. While seemingly broad, there are a number of conditions applied to 
this exception. First, each of these listed regions may only do this a maximum of 10 times 
annually. Second, the total value of each procurement cannot exceed CDN $1 million. Such 
derogations must only be used to support small firms or employment in non-urban areas, and 
there can be no federal funding involved in the project. Finally there are strict notification 
requirements for any procurement pursued under these arrangements, including an explanation 
of the circumstances tendered at least 30 days in advance. It is worth observing that under the 
WTO GPA, Canada reserved its capacity to set aside a portion of government contracts for 
minority owned or small businesses.20 Such reservation does not appear in the CETA, however 
such exceptions may have been redundant given the relatively low monetary thresholds of the 
chapter’s coverage. 
 
Among the most important extensions of coverage in CETA’s procurement disciplines 
relate to mass transit services. While not specifically referring to mass transit, Canada’s central 
government procurement commitments under the GPA excluded urban rail and urban 
transportation equipment, systems, and components.21 Such projects, such as the ongoing 
multi-billion dollar extension of the Toronto subway system, have the potential to generate 
significant revenues for domestic firms. CETA prohibits federal as well as provincial 
governments from imposing new local content requirements on transit purchases, with two 
specific exemptions for Ontario and Quebec listed in Annex X-04. Although the Ontario’s and 
Quebec’s discriminatory transit procurement laws can be kept, CETA imposes severe 
restrictions on their implementation. In Quebec, Canadian content requirements for mass 
transit, often believed to be as high as 60 per cent for some projects, are now limited to 25 per 
cent, which is also the maximum Canadian-content for Ontario’s mass transit contracts. Quebec 
retains the right to insist that ‘final production’ of any mass transit vehicles must take place in 
Canada. It is noteworthy that Bombardier, the Canadian multinational transportation company 
which constructs vehicles such as subway trains and which supplied Montreal’s subways, is 
located in Quebec. These provisions demonstrate hard-fought concessions on the part of 
Canada’s largest and most vote-rich provincial governments. 
 
 A full discussion of the EU’s commitments under CETA’s procurement chapter is 
beyond the scope of this article. At a general level, the EU’s specific commitments, which run 
to many pages in order to cover each of the EU’s member states, appear to be less restrictive 
than those made by Canada and its provinces, granting Canadian firms extensive market access 
across many spheres of economic activity. There are notable exceptions relating to ports, 
utilities, shipbuilding and broadcasting, which are consistent with limits placed in the Revised 
GPA.22 At least with respect to services, the EU’s willingness to make further government 
procurement commitments once Canada reciprocates is evident in the phrase: ‘The EU stands 
ready, should the ongoing revision of EU legislation on public procurement result in a widening 
                                                          
20
 Revised GPA (n 9) Annex 7 note 2. 
21
 ibid Annex 7 note 1 b). 
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 ibid Annex 7. 
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of the scope of services and services concessions covered by that legislation, to take up 
negotiations with Canada in view of extending the mutual coverage of services and services 
concessions of this Chapter’.23 The EU’s apparent comfort with a liberalized procurement 
regime may reflect the legacy of its common market, which has underpinned the deep economic 
integration of its geographically and culturally disparate constituent member states for decades. 
The EU is by its nature a collectively-minded institution in a way that Canada, despite its 
membership in NAFTA and its federation of partially autonomous provinces, is not. Canada’s 
cautious procurement commitments of its sub-central governments, in particular the MASH 
sector, may equally demonstrate the greater importance of localism in Canadian society, 
possibly itself the consequence of Canada’s highly dispersed population comprised of many 
geographically isolated communities. Suggestions by civil society groups that the MASH 
sector’s crucial ‘buy local’ practices will be harmed by the new regime are not convincing24—
it is not clear that there was ever much of a ‘buy local’ culture in these institutions as many 
insist. Still, to the extent that there is that a greater tendency for governmental policy to be 
pursued by towns and cities in Canada than in places like the EU, there is a need for these 
entities to embrace efficient procurement practices which include bridging the local-global 
divide so that they might better meet challenges faced at the local level, such as neighbourhood 
revitalization.25 
  
It is vitally important to recognize that since international law does not have direct 
effect in Canada, CETA is not legally binding on any of Canada’s affected procuring entities 
until is ratified by the federal and provincial governments (under the Canadian Constitution the 
municipal governments only have delegated authority through provinces).26 This requires 
specific enabling legislation or regulations. With the exception of the federal government, no 
Canadian province or territory has yet enacted the procurement obligations of the WTO GPA 
or even the AIT. This is problematic because, according to the Supreme Court of Canada,27 the 
commitments contained in these agreements do not create freestanding rights that can be legally 
enforced. It is far from clear that when CETA is finally ratified that any provincial or territorial 
governments in Canada, other than perhaps the federal government, will enact it into law by 
legislation or regulation. Furthermore, if the relevant sub-central jurisdictions do not establish 
a bid challenge mechanism, meaning a domestic tribunal to hear allegations concerning any 
breaches of obligations contained in the procurement chapter of CETA, the disciplines 
themselves do little to protect an aggrieved bidder. The only way to create a truly effective 
government procurement agreement is to provide parties with the genuine ability to challenge 
government decision-making when breaches occur and to provide appropriate relief. Although 
the WTO GPA required provincial / territorial authorities to develop bid challenge 
mechanisms, whether through an independent, quasi-judicial body like the CITT or 
conventional judicial or administrative processes, none has done so yet. As such, disappointed 
bidders currently do not have a route through which to complain when one of these sub-central 
governments fails to respect the agreement’s procurement obligations. It is uncertain whether 
the provincial governments of Canada will ever create a proper bid challenge pathway for 
bidders under the GPA, let alone CETA. This is precisely why the much maligned investor-
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 Annex 5 notes. 
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 Constitution Act, 1867 (n 4) s. 92(8). 
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 Northrop Grumman Overseas Services Corporation v Attorney General of Canada and Lockheed Martin 
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state dispute settlement, which as noted above does not apply to CETA’s procurement chapter, 
is such an essential feature of regional trade agreements. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Commentators have praised CETA, including its procurement provisions, for its 
capacity to expand opportunities for Canadian and EU firms in each other’s markets and to 
enhance competition.28 Yet with respect to procurement at least, CETA actually provides very 
little beyond what Canada has already committed under the WTO GPA. Much of the language 
of CETA’s procurement chapter is taken directly from the GPA and should come as no surprise 
to procuring entities in Canada or to well-advised Canadian firms seeking opportunities in EU 
markets. Still, civil society groups are concerned that changes brought about by CETA have 
the potential to infringe upon key procurement activities of some smaller governmental 
agencies in Canada. As a consequence of its lower thresholds and extensive coverage of a wide 
range of local entities, CETA will impair the ability of provincial and municipal governments 
to use procurement as an instrument of economic and social development, however worthy or 
misguided (or non-existent) such initiatives may be.  
 
CETA, like the GPA, will also require Canadian provinces and municipalities to bear 
the potentially significant administrative costs associated with the provision of information 
about their procurement practices and available tenders, including accounting to unsuccessful 
bidders of the reasons for their decisions. Since these must be challengeable before 
administrative procedures where monetary damages may be awarded, procurement decisions 
at all levels will need to be approached with caution. If the Canadian provinces ever ratify 
CETA and create the required tribunals, Canadian provincial and municipal governments may 
witness their procurement initiatives being frustrated by delays as a consequence of both 
disclosure and bid challenge rules. While the economic advantages of enhanced market access 
for trillions of dollars of public contracts must be welcomed, open and fair government 
procurement comes at the price of closer scrutiny over a wide range of policy decisions, 
especially at the local level. Surely this must be viewed as an acceptable burden in societies 
like Canada and Europe which are governed by the rule of law. If surrendering some aspects 
of localism to the forces of international competition can also be seen as the next stage of 
globalization, then CETA’s procurement regime represents a milestone in international 
economic governance. 
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 E.g. D Kiselbach, ‘The Canada-EU Free Trade Agreement Demystified: New Opportunities for Trade, 
Investment and Government Procurement’ (2014) 9[2] GT & CJ 52. 
